feat(ticket-048): publish github event acquisition adapter without env fallbacks - #66
feat(ticket-048): publish github event acquisition adapter without env fallbacks#66tom-sapletta-com wants to merge 11 commits into
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…ance Plan-only commit. Declares the republication route for ticket-047's adapter and the removal of its two process.env fallbacks, whose verify:env requirement forced an edit to .env.example — a path no workstream owns and that the hash-locked manifest cannot be extended to cover. Carries the ticket-047 record across unchanged, including its explicit note that no Koru review or Validator attestation was obtained. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…v fallbacks Republishes ticket-047's bounded GitHub acquisition adapter through a route CI governance accepts, and removes the defect that made it unpublishable. The adapter previously fell back to process.env.GITHUB_EVENT_PATH and process.env.GITHUB_REPOSITORY. verify:env scans scripts/** and turns every process.env read into an .env.example requirement, but .env.example is owned by no workstream and .governance/manifest.json is hash-locked to the pinned upstream standard, so no ticket could legally declare those keys. Both fallbacks are gone. Input resolves only from --event-path, --repository or the payload's own repository.full_name, and a missing repository now names the flag. A new case sets both variables in the child environment and asserts the adapter still fails closed, writes no output and never echoes the ambient value. verify:env passes with .env.example byte-identical to the protected base. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Every emitted event recorded SOURCE "github-api", carried over from ticket-047. The adapter makes no API call: it reads a payload delivered by GitHub Actions, and its own ticket declares API polling a non-goal. Claiming API provenance contradicts the contract rule that missing knowledge is never guessed. All four mappings now record SOURCE "github-actions", a value already established in the ticket-045 golden fixture. The ambient-environment case asserts it on every emitted event. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Added Defect found in the carried-over ticket-047 code: every emitted event recorded All four mappings now record Also audited the diff for secret-shaped literals, since the Validator rejected #62 for a Re-verified at |
Autonomy path (validator)Root cause of no bot review: Actions taken:
Trust root preserved: reviewer is still outside the reviewed repository; todo2code never triggers its own approval. |
…n note Document that PR #66 is blocked only on trusted approval, point at the ticket-049 plan branch for operator/refactor work, and note that CI wiring of the adapter is deferred without collapsing the external Validator trust root.
Empty commit only. No product change. Previous verify/governance jobs failed resolving action download info (Service Unavailable).
Link external twin-probes / validator-agent docs so operators know where publication.gate and GOV-APPROVAL tooling live.
Autonomy status (automated)
Do not push further commits while freeze is pending. When Actions recovers, operators should run: ~/github/subactor/validator-agent/bin/dispatch-direct-pr.sh \
--owner semcod --name todo2code --pr 66 --ticket ticket-048 \
--wait-checks --watchDiagnosis probe: |
The previous note blamed a missing scan-direct job in validator-agent main. Both halves were re-checked and neither holds: the scan variables are set with a semcod/todo2code entry, and scan-direct is present on validator-agent origin/main. The gate job test recorded zero steps and was cancelled after 23 minutes, so validate and scan-direct were skipped — it never obtained a runner. The backlog spans all six workflows in that repository while semcod/todo2code drains normally. The autonomy configuration is correct; the executor is starved. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Conditions 1-8 of steady-state autonomy all held for PR #66 on 2026-08-06 and no review appeared. Adds precondition 9: the validator run must actually obtain a runner. Records the zero-steps signature — a job with no steps that is then cancelled never started — as the way to tell an infrastructure stall from a validator rejection, which always produces steps and a verdict. Also warns against the inference this section originally drew: during an Actions major_outage an uneven backlog is not evidence of an organization budget problem, because a repository that keeps draining is not a control group. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…dget The previous commit blamed an Actions capacity or spending limit in the subactor organization, reasoning that semcod/todo2code kept draining. That inference was wrong: status.github.com reported Actions in major_outage, and during an outage repositories stall unevenly, so one that keeps draining is not a control group. The observation that stands is the zero-steps signature: the gate job recorded no steps and was cancelled, so it never obtained a runner. Analysis lives in ticket-049 2.2.1. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Autonomy continue (update)
Command after checks green: ~/github/subactor/validator-agent/bin/dispatch-direct-pr.sh \
--owner semcod --name todo2code --pr 66 --ticket ticket-048 \
--wait-checks --watch |
Validator direct-pr rejected the PR for a secret-shaped literal that only appeared in a narrative log line about PR #62. Reword the audit note so the scanner no longer matches.
Validator progress
This matches the known direct-pr failure mode (see validator-agent: unreadable checks vs missing CI). User-scoped Next (human / App admin)
Do not push more commits unless addressing a real product issue — each push restarts CI and freeze. |
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Deterministic Validator approval for exact head 33d62df339d411ed25e2f5554676233cf1ebc097.
Ticket: ticket-048
Correlation ID: todo2code-pr-66-ticket-048
Model: openrouter/z-ai/glm-5.2
Reviewed diff chunks: 7
Advisory LLM verdict: BLOCK
Advisory summary: Reviewed all 7 diff chunk(s). This chunk adds documentation, ticket records, and historical artifacts for ticket-047 and ticket-048. The diff content is documentation and metadata only (README, changelog, logs, intent, TODO, TICKETS index, EVENT_LOG_DSL docs). No executable source code changes are visible in this chunk. The PR body describes removing process.env fallbacks from scripts/github-event-log.mjs, but that script's actual code is not in this chunk. The test_results_data reports one failed check ('Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'), which mandates a non-APPROVE verdict. However, since this is a documentation-only chunk, the failure likely originates from code/test chunks reviewed separately. | This chunk contains ticket-047 governance scaffold files (ai-codex.md, changelog.md, intent.json, preprompt.md) and the start of ticket-048's README. The intent.json declares a well-scoped adapter with clear allowed/forbidden paths and validation criteria. The historical record is transparent about prior publication failures. However, the test_results_data contains a failing check ('Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'), which per validation rules prevents APPROVAL. The visible code is documentation/metadata only; no executable code is shown in this chunk. | This chunk contains ticket-048 documentation, agent logs, and participant records. The PR republishes ticket-047's GitHub event-log adapter by removing process.env fallbacks and making CLI flags required. Documentation is thorough and the security boundary improvement (removing ambient environment reads) is sound. However, test_results_data shows one failing check ('Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL') which blocks approval. | A required check in test_results_data is failing: 'Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'. Per validation rules, a failed check precludes APPROVE and mandates BLOCK. The diff chunk shows the script entrypoint (scripts/github-event-log.mjs) beginning cleanly with no process.env reads, CLI-only flag parsing, and strict input validation, which is consistent with the PR's stated security boundary; however, the visible code is only a partial fragment of the script and cannot be fully assessed for completeness. | Live OpenRouter contract check failed. PR introduces GitHub event-log adapter code with input validation, but untrusted test results contain a failing check requiring block per protocol. | This diff chunk adds GitHub event-to-event-log mapping logic for pull_request_review and workflow_run events, plus test fixtures and a test file import. The code is largely well-structured, but a failed CI check (Live OpenRouter contract) mandates REQUEST_CHANGES. Additionally, the test file diff shown only adds an import and path constants with no visible new test cases in this chunk, and the workflow_run_with_bad_timestamp fixture has head_sha at the top level rather than inside workflow_run, which may cause validation errors depending on asSha's null tolerance. | A failed check is present in test_results_data ('Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'), which mandates BLOCK per review rules. No security finding is inferable from this chunk alone; the code shown is test-only and validates fail-closed behavior for ambient environment handling, unsupported review states, and payload leak prevention. The tests themselves appear well-structured for the visible chunk.
Advisory findings: test_results_data contains a failed check: 'Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'. Per validation rules, this prevents APPROVE regardless of which chunk triggered it.; test_results_data contains a failed check: 'Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'. Per validation rules, APPROVE is not permitted when any check has failed.; Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL — a failing check in test_results_data prohibits approval per validation rules; test_results_data contains a failed check: 'Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'. No APPROVE is permitted while any check is failing.; Test results include 'Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'; protocol prohibits APPROVE when any check fails.; test_results_data contains a failed check: 'Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'. Per review policy, APPROVE is prohibited when any check has failed.; test_results_data contains a failed check: 'Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'. Rules require never APPROVE when a failed check exists, and BLOCK applies when a failed check is present.; Removal of process.env.GITHUB_EVENT_PATH and process.env.GITHUB_REPOSITORY fallbacks is a positive security change — a bounded acquisition boundary should not silently inherit ambient process state. No new secret exposure or vulnerability introduced in this chunk.; Adapter claims to remove both process.env fallbacks (GITHUB_EVENT_PATH, GITHUB_REPOSITORY); the visible code confirms no process.env imports or reads in the shown portion. The remaining ~437 lines must confirm no ambient-environment reads, no eval/exec of payload data, and no path traversal via --event-path/--output before full attestation.; createPushEvents asActor fallback of 'github' allows a default actor identity when no pusher/sender is present; ensure downstream consumers treat 'github:github' as a system/anonymous actor and do not elevate trust.; canonicalEvidence uses stableStringify on raw payload-derived objects; verify no secrets (tokens, webhooks secrets) are present in retained evidence payloads.; Fixture 'workflow_run_secret' deliberately includes a 'secret' field and nested 'raw_payload' with query/headers to verify canonicalEvidence strips sensitive data. This is a positive security test; confirm canonicalEvidence is allowlist-based rather than denylist-based so unknown sensitive fields are excluded.
The LLM output above is advisory and was not used as the approval trust root.
Merge was not requested or performed.
Decision record (recomputable)
DECISION D-048-0902
TICKET ticket-048
HEAD_SHA 33d62df339d411ed25e2f5554676233cf1ebc097
CORRELATION_ID todo2code-pr-66-ticket-048
ACTOR agent:ifuri-validator-agent[bot]
APPLIED_RULE P-CORE-015
INPUT author_login = "tom-sapletta-com"
INPUT observed_checks = ["koru / code-review=PASS","Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in)=FAIL","verify=PASS","Java adapter (JDK 17 required)=PASS"]
INPUT required_checks = ["verify","Java adapter (JDK 17 required)","koru / code-review"]
INPUT required_checks_source = "env/request"
INPUT reviewer_login = "ifuri-validator-agent[bot]"
VERDICT APPROVE AUTHORITY DETERMINISTIC
REJECTED REQUEST_CHANGES BECAUSE NO_UNSAFE_CHANGE_REASON_FOUND
ADVISORY llm_verdict = "BLOCK" MODEL "openrouter/z-ai/glm-5.2"
ASSERT VERDICT_AUTHORITY != "ADVISORY"Validator append-only log (ticket-032 AC-04).
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Deterministic Validator approval for exact head 071b707c342b8c67e373fc1899578c21d90a0c02.
Ticket: ticket-048
Correlation ID: todo2code-pr-66-ticket-048
Model: openrouter/z-ai/glm-5.2
Reviewed diff chunks: 7
Advisory LLM verdict: REQUEST_CHANGES
Advisory summary: Reviewed all 7 diff chunk(s). This chunk adds documentation, ticket metadata, and historical records for the ticket-047/ticket-048 GitHub event acquisition adapter. The docs clearly describe a fail-closed, no-process.env boundary. However, the provided test results include one failing check (Live OpenRouter contract), which prohibits approval. Additionally, only documentation and ticket-metadata files are visible in this chunk; the actual script and test code changes are in other chunks and cannot be assessed here. | This chunk contains governance documentation, intent.json, changelog, and participant records for ticket-047 and ticket-048. The PR republishes ticket-047's GitHub event log adapter after removing process.env fallbacks that caused the .env.example governance blocker. The intent.json declares proper allowedPaths/forbiddenPaths, budget constraints, and validation criteria. The documentation clearly explains why the prior attempt failed (GOV-INTENT-003, GOV-TICKET-001, unownable .env.example path) and how the structural fix addresses each blocker. No security issues found in the visible code. Test results show verify PASS, Koru code-review PASS, and Java adapter PASS; the Live OpenRouter contract FAIL is an opt-in check outside core verification. | Chunk 3 of 7 contains ticket-048 project documentation, agent logs, and participant records. The changes remove process.env fallbacks from the GitHub event log adapter, require explicit flags, and carry forward ticket-047's historical record. The PR body and logs are internally consistent. However, the test_results_data includes a failing check (Live OpenRouter contract: FAIL), which mandates REQUEST_CHANGES per protocol. No security issues or code defects are visible in this documentation-only chunk. | This chunk introduces the ticket-048 governance scaffold, the github-event-log.mjs adapter script (beginning), and supporting documentation. The diff is mostly governance metadata, decision logs, changelogs, and the initial portion of the adapter script. A blocking concern is the test results data showing a failed check ('Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'), which requires changes before approval. The adapter script shown here removes process.env fallbacks (a stated security improvement), but the full script is not visible in this chunk to confirm complete removal. | Reviewed chunk 5 of the github-event-log.mjs adapter. It removes process.env fallbacks and validates input via flags/payload only. The parser handles --help, odd-length args, duplicate options, and missing values. However, a clear truncation/incomplete function boundary is visible at createPullRequestReviewEvents, making this chunk impossible to validate for completeness. | The chunk shows GitHub event builders for pull_request_review and workflow_run, plus the main() entry point and test fixtures. The code removes process.env fallbacks (per PR intent) and validates inputs defensively. However, there are correctness concerns in the workflow_run timestamp handling and a potential correlation-id fallback issue, and one test suite is reported as failing. | This chunk adds comprehensive tests for the GitHub event collector adapter, covering push payload mapping, review event trust classification, fail-closed behavior for unsupported review states, evidence allowlisting/leak prevention, and ambient environment rejection. The tests are well-structured and assert security-relevant properties including no process.env fallback, no payload field leakage, and fail-closed on missing required inputs. However, the test results data shows a failing check ('Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL') which precludes approval.
Advisory findings: test_results_data contains a failed check: 'Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'. A failing check must be resolved or shown to be opt-in/non-blocking with evidence before approval.; test_results_data contains a failed check: 'Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'. Regardless of its opt-in nature, the protocol prohibits APPROVE when any check in test_results_data has failed.; Test results data contains a failed check: 'Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'. Per policy, this cannot be approved until all checks pass.; createPullRequestReviewEvents function is cut off mid-body after the actor assignment; cannot assess whether event creation and validation are correct for review events. Given the instruction to treat this as a complete chunk, I report this as a visible structural gap: the chunk ends at a statement that does not terminate the function, so semantic correctness of review-event handling cannot be confirmed.; Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL — test_results_data contains a failed check; cannot APPROVE per rules.; In createWorkflowRunEvents, the workflow_run_with_bad_timestamp fixture sets updated_at to '2026-08-05 08:13:00' (space separator) while created_at is ISO '2026-08-05T08:13:30Z'. The builder uses updated_at first; if asTimestamp rejects the space-separated format, the fixture path may be the intended error test, but there is no head_sha validation handling shown for workflow_run_with_bad_timestamp (it omits workflow_run.head_sha and sets a top-level head_sha that the builder does not read via that path). This may cause an unexpected validation error rather than the intended timestamp rejection.; In main(), correlationFallback reads payload.review?.id but createPullRequestReviewEvents accesses review at payload.review — consistent. However correlationFallback does not include payload.pull_request?.number or a review-specific fallback from payload.review?.id before pull_request?.id; ordering means a PR event without an id may still resolve to sender.id, which is a weak correlation source for push events (payload.pusher lacks id in fixtures). Verify asString(options.correlationId, correlationFallback) throws when fallback is empty for push events with no sender.id.; Test results data contains a failed check: 'Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in): FAIL'. Per policy, APPROVE cannot be issued when any check has failed.; No security findings. The removal of process.env fallbacks is a security improvement: it prevents a bounded acquisition boundary from silently inheriting ambient process state, which could otherwise allow unexpected environment-driven behavior.; No process.env reads present in the visible code, consistent with the stated boundary fix. Fixtures include a workflow_run_secret payload with 'secret' and 'raw_payload' fields; verify that canonicalEvidence only serializes whitelisted fields (not visible in this chunk) so secret/raw_payload never appear in output. The fixture exists to assert this, which is appropriate, but the guarantee depends on canonicalEvidence behavior outside this chunk.
The LLM output above is advisory and was not used as the approval trust root.
Merge was not requested or performed.
Decision record (recomputable)
DECISION D-048-2831
TICKET ticket-048
HEAD_SHA 071b707c342b8c67e373fc1899578c21d90a0c02
CORRELATION_ID todo2code-pr-66-ticket-048
ACTOR agent:ifuri-validator-agent[bot]
APPLIED_RULE P-CORE-015
INPUT author_login = "tom-sapletta-com"
INPUT observed_checks = ["koru / code-review=PASS","Live OpenRouter contract (opt-in)=FAIL","verify=PASS","Java adapter (JDK 17 required)=PASS"]
INPUT required_checks = ["verify","Java adapter (JDK 17 required)","koru / code-review"]
INPUT required_checks_source = "env/request"
INPUT reviewer_login = "ifuri-validator-agent[bot]"
VERDICT APPROVE AUTHORITY DETERMINISTIC
REJECTED REQUEST_CHANGES BECAUSE NO_UNSAFE_CHANGE_REASON_FOUND
ADVISORY llm_verdict = "REQUEST_CHANGES" MODEL "openrouter/z-ai/glm-5.2"
ASSERT VERDICT_AUTHORITY != "ADVISORY"Validator append-only log (ticket-032 AC-04).
Ticket:
ticket-048Correlation ID:
todo2code-pr-66-ticket-048Republishes ticket-047's GitHub acquisition adapter through a route CI governance accepts, and fixes the defect that made it unpublishable.
Why the previous attempt failed
PR #64 was rejected for three independent reasons, none of which
make governancecould show — that command compares the working tree toHEAD, while CI comparesbase..head:GOV-INTENT-003intent.jsonand the implementation landed in one commit; the plan must exist in a strictly earlier commitGOV-TICKET-001DONEbefore publication, and a closed ticket holds no authority over implementation paths.env.examplefollow-up touches a path no workstream owns, and.governance/manifest.jsonis hash-locked to the pinned upstream standardThe fix
The third blocker had a cause inside the adapter:
scripts/github-event-log.mjsfell back toprocess.env.GITHUB_EVENT_PATHandprocess.env.GITHUB_REPOSITORY.verify:envscansscripts/**and turns everyprocess.envread into an.env.examplerequirement — so an acquisition boundary that reads the environment cannot be published in this repository at all.Both fallbacks are removed. This is a better boundary regardless of governance: a bounded acquisition step should take its input explicitly rather than inherit ambient process state. Input now resolves only from
--event-path,--repository, or the payload's ownrepository.full_name, and a missing repository names the flag.The other two blockers are addressed structurally: the branch is cut from the protected base (so
.env.examplenever enters the diff), the plan sits in commitb82e10aand the implementation in2a25976, and ticket-048 staysIN_PROGRESS / VALIDATIONuntil this PR merges — notDONEbeforehand, which is exactly what stranded ticket-047.Changes
scripts/github-event-log.mjs— noprocess.envreads; flags requiredtest/workflow-validation.test.ts— new case sets both variables in the child environment and asserts the adapter fails closed, writes no output file, and never echoes the ambient repository valuedocs/EVENT_LOG_DSL.md— required flags, deliberate absence of environment reads, and why that constraint existstest/fixtures/event-log/v1/github-event-payloads.json— carried across unchangedproject/ticket-047/**— historical record carried across verbatim, including its explicit note that it never obtained Koru or Validator approval.env.example,.governance/**,.github/workflows/**andsrc/**are untouched.Verification
project/governance-check.sh --actor ci --base b8392f7 --head 2a25976— GOV-PASS, the check PR feat(ticket-047): add github event acquisition event log adapter #64 could not passmake governance— GOV-PASS (0 errors, 0 warnings)make verify— 402 tests, 401 pass, 1 skip, 0 failnpm run verify:env— passes with.env.examplebyte-identical toorigin/mainmake docker-smoke— PASSgit diff --check— cleanKnown gap
CHANGELOG.mdgets no entry: like.env.example, it is owned by no workstream, so no ticket can edit it. That is the same trap this PR removes for.env.example, and it remains open for a future governance ticket.🤖 Generated with Claude Code